There seems to be a wide variety of violent circumstances that we are inclined to label terrorism, from intentional harming of innocent civilians to wartime killing of soldiers in non military pursuits by insurgents. Motives can include demonstration of power by the 'weak', revenge on innocent civilian symbols of an ascribed enemy, political and civil society change by the enemy, creating fear and insecurity in the enemy population, intert-causation between the last two.

 

Same side soldier on soldier killing as at Ft Hood. is of course fratricide for a start. Motivation may be a puzzler if mental pathology is in volved. That is, rational intent must be probed for. The evidence of preparation suggests such intent, but pathological symptoms can be sustained over time. Is it possible that Hasan felt overwhelmed by assaults on his ego and life prospects and needed to strike out at whomever was 'convenient'?

 

Finding the right label for an apparently idiosyncratic action, however monstrous, seems less important than identifying the army's selection and evaluation structures that let a marginal personality slip through.

 

4/27/2007    WashingtonPost.com

 

Wolfowitz's very appointment to the World Bank Presidency was an act of high corruption, a favor for an unqualified Bush groupie. Wolfie qualifies better as a defendent in a war crines trial. How else to treat someone who steered the US into a self-bleeding pointless war of aggression?

 St. Louis Post-Dispatch

 

 Congratulations on a fine analysis of the scene in Afghanistan on the brink of President Obama aching decision on strategy there.  Karzai may be politically and culturally unable to constrain what  we consider corruption.  That sort of major change may be what's required in a modern nation, but Afghanistan is very, very far from becoming a modern state. While getting out militarily seems the right choice, I think that this must be done with as much care and deliberation on the stages of getting out as on the strategy itself.   For one thing, we do have a moral obligation because of the damage that we have added on top of the several other sources, as well as simply to end the military violence.

 

Because of the larger moral obligation, we must do what we can for the people, as opposed to the hapless government.  Direct project funding to  rural localities as described in the New York Times on Nov. 12 seems the right way to go, as I have been writing to several media outlets in recent months.  To provide, where necessary, security for a much more robust nationwide program - now called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) - of  usually modest projects, we might retain a number of small, rapid response forces' bases at early stage in the draw down of our military. These small bases could keep an eye and intelligence on possible al-Qaida movements, and perhaps focus on  training limited numbers of elite Afghan Special Operations forces.  Training massive numbers of army and police is beyond our limited cultural understanding of their parochial loyalties.  In any case,efforts at creating national security forces  may remain vulnerable to  the culturally endemic nepotism and divided loyalties. 

       

Projects should be carefully negotiated with local power holders, or councils, including the Taliban(s) (a mixed bag) to address locally popular basic reconstruction needs, not excluding mosques.  As civilian NATO (that's us, too) PRT facilitators reach accommodations with local Taliban leaders, these work sites should become more secure and reduce the need for the rapid response bases.  The US might provide the largest share of the directed funding and of  course a share of the well selected and trained foreign facilitators for usually modest local improvements.  The foreigners may help conceptualize the improvements after patiently listening to consensual local needs and plans.  After becoming convinced of commitment of local  effort, participation and responsibility, then the foreigners should try to be unobtrusive, generally just doling out the money from their generous autonomous allocations as really needed.  Local people often have the artisanal skills and usually the labor for restoring their damaged infrastructure.  Foreign technical  expertise would be a bonus and sometimes  - one hopes rarely - necessary.  Such a large eventually nationwide reconstruction program might not work to significantly uplift Afghanistan, the sources of possible trouble are many,  and it would take commitment of several years.  But there are no clearly right options, and this one seem s to have a chance for bettering the lives of large number of Afghans  if adapted to their varying circumstances. 

 

     Given the inseparable role of Pakistan and its border regions in Afghanistan's problems, perhaps the most important diplomatic front we might work on would be a major effort to reduce suspicion and fear between Pakistan and India.  That would seem to make it easier  fro Pakistan to join us in something approaching an alliance to demilitarize Taliban and to take, or  drive, out bin- Laden and his gang presumably in one of the Waziristans. 

 

         I am throwing all of this at you as a fleshing out of your keen analysis, but perhaps to argue that exiting, even militarily, will not be easy and should lead to another more

humanistic kind of involvement.

WashingtonPost.com                                                                                                    12/4/2009

 

Let's not be so sure that we are not fighting a nationalist movement in Afghanistan, just not the Karzai government's. The uniting purpose of the various Talibans is to drive the foreigners from holy soil, a time honored goal. And be careful about the "surge" urge on the supposed Iraq model. Remember, the key there was the initiative of al Anbar Sunni chiefs to shift from fighting against us to fighting with us.

 

I hope the Obama strategy works, but I cannot avoid being pessimistic as it now stands.

NewYorkTimes.com                                                                                            11/30/2009

 

Given the anxieties in  Pakistan over whatever troop numbers decision that we come up with, there is a diplomatic front  where attention could produce considerable improvement  for our interests in Afghanistan.  That would be vigorous, if initially quiet, effort to reduced the fear and suspicion between Pakistan and India.  That might enable Pakistan to more  wholeheartedly apply its resources to suppression of all the Taliban - even al Qaida - in the AfPak border region.  Nothing is a sure bet in  this entanglement.  But we cannot avoid decisions.